Abstract
Introduction
The problem of protecting confidential data in a multilevel system is one of the relevant issues in computer security. Information flow security aims at guaranteeing that no high level (confidential) information is revealed to users running at low levels [8, 14, 5, 17, 22, 20] , even in the presence of any possible malicious process. An early attempt to formalize the absence of information flow was the concept of noninterference proposed in the seminal paper by Goguen and Meseguer [9] , and further developed in [5, 6, 3, 11, 18, 21, 10] . Intuitively, to establish that information does not flow from high to low it is sufficient to establish that high behavior has no effect on what low level users can observe, i.e., the low level view of the system is independent of high behavior. A process which is secure with respect to this notion is thus secure whatever the surrounding high level environment is.
Our work starts from the observation that such a requirement could be too demanding when some knowledge about the environment (context) in which the process is going to run is available. Thus, we face the problem of generalizing the notion of noninterference to deal with specific classes of contexts. In our approach a context can perform both high and low level actions and can also incorporate possible attackers.
As an example consider a process representing a client of a bank using his cash card in an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) to make a withdrawal from his account. When the card is inserted in the ATM the code of the card is read, then the client can write his PIN code, and if the PIN is correct he can ask for the cash. All the actions involved concern the exchange of confidential (high level) information between the client and the bank. We can formalize the process representing the client in front of the ATM as a CCSlike term, named CLIENT, of the form CARD.PIN.CASH.0, where CARD and PIN denote the client's output actions of giving the card and the pin codes, while CASH represents the input action of receiving the cash. All these actions are classified as high level actions. A correct ATM should read the codes, and if they are correct, it should give the cash to the client. Hence, leaving out the details concerning the checks of the codes, we represent an ATM as a context of the form X|CARD.PIN.CASH.0 where the variable X will be replaced by CLIENT when the client will interact with the machine. Since all the data are protected, no (high) information is revealed to an external observer; hence we can assume that the above ATM context is secure for the process CLIENT. Imagine now that a maintenance engineer puts a laptop inside the ATM. The laptop records all the card numbers and the PINs of the ATM's users. We can also imagine that once the confidential data have been captured the laptop send them to the bank so that the client receives the cash and does not suspect the fraud. Then LAPTOP is CARD.PIN.RECORD.CARD.PIN.0, where RECORD is a non protected (low) output action. The counterfeit context is the parallel composition of the two components: the correct ATM and the LAPTOP. Clearly, this context is not secure for the process CLIENT. However, this does not mean that we give up using cards and ATMs. We just want to be sure to use them in secure contexts.
To deal with these situations we introduce the notion of secure contexts for a class of processes. This notion is parametric with respect to both an observation equivalence relation and an operation used to characterize the low level view of a process. In this paper we consider instances with weak bisimulation and trace equivalence as observation equivalence. We show how to build secure contexts and prove that the security properties known as BNDC and NDC (see [5] ) are just special instances of our general security notion.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the SPA language and its semantics. Section 3 introduces our definition of secure contexts for a class of processes. In Sections 4 and 5 we study two instances of our general definition through weak bisimulation and trace equivalence, respectively. Some conclusions are drawn Section 7.
Basic Notions
The Security Process Algebra (SPA) [5] is a variation of Milner's CCS [16] , where the set of visible actions is partitioned into high level actions and low level ones in order to specify multilevel systems. SPA syntax is based on the same elements as CCS, i.e.: a set L of visible actions such that L = I ∪ O where I = {a, b, . . .} is a set of input actions and O = {ā,b, . . .} is a set of output actions; a special action τ which models internal computations, not visible outside the system; a complement function· : L → L, such thatā = a, for all a ∈ L. Act = L ∪ {τ } is the set of all actions. Function· is extended to Act by definingτ = τ . The set of visible actions is partitioned into two sets, H and L, of high and low actions such that H = H and L = L. The syntax of SPA terms is defined as follows:
We apply the standard notions of free and bound (occurrences of) variables in a SPA term. More precisely, all the occurrences of the variable Z in recZ.T are bound; while Z is free in a term T if there is an occurrence of Z in T which is not bound. Definition 2.1 A SPA process is a SPA term without free variables. We denote by E the set of all SPA processes, ranged over by E, F, . . ., and by E H the set of all high level processes, i.e., those constructed only using actions belonging to H ∪ {τ }.
The operational semantics of SPA processes is given in terms of Labelled Transition Systems (LTS, for short). In particular, the LTS (E, Act, →), whose states are processes, is defined by structural induction as the least relation generated by the axioms and inference rules reported in Figure 1 , where a is an action of Act, while l belongs to L.
Intuitively, 0 is the empty process that does nothing; a.E is a process that can perform an action a and then behaves as E; E 1 + E 2 represents the nondeterministic choice between the two processes E 1 and E 2 ; E 1 |E 2 is the parallel composition of E 1 and E 2 , where executions are interleaved, possibly synchronized on complementary input/output actions, producing the silent action τ ; E \ v is a process E prevented from performing actions in v 1 ; E[f ] is the process E whose actions are renamed via the relabelling function f ; if in T there is at most the free variable Z, then recZ.T [Z] is the recursive process which can perform all the actions of the process obtained by substituting recZ.
For the definition of security properties it is also useful the hiding operator, /, of CSP which can be defined as a relabelling as follows:
A SPA term with free variables can be seen as an environment with holes (the free occurrences of its variables) in which other SPA terms can be inserted. The result of this substitution is still a SPA term, which could be a process. For instance, in the term h.0|(l.X + τ.0) we can replace the variable X with the processh.0 obtaining the process h. 0| We can also consider a context as a derived SPA constructor. In fact it can be used to build SPA terms from sets of SPA terms. Its arity is determined by the number of its free variables. For instance X|X can be seen as a constructor of arity 1 which transforms any process E into the parallel composition with itself, E|E.
Given The concept of observation equivalence is used to establish equalities among processes and it is based on the idea that two systems have the same semantics if and only if they cannot be distinguished by an external observer. This is obtained by defining an equivalence relation over E equating two processes when they are indistinguishable. In this paper we consider the relations named weak bisimulation, ≈ B , and trace equivalence, ≈ T .
Let us first introduce the following auxiliary notations.
an → E , then we write E t → E and we say that E is reachable from E. 
We also write
Two processes E, F ∈ E are weakly bisimilar, denoted by E ≈ B F , if there exists a weak bisimulation R containing the pair (E, F ).
The relation ≈ B is the largest weak bisimulation and it is an equivalence relation.
The trace equivalence relation equates two processes if they have the same sets of traces, again, without considering the τ actions.
Definition 2.4 [Trace Equivalence]
For any process E ∈ E the set of traces T r(E) associated with E is defined by:
Trace equivalence is less demanding than weak bisimulation, hence if two processes are weakly bisimilar, then they are also trace equivalent.
Following [16] we extend binary relations on processes to contexts as follows.
Definition 2.5 [Relations on
Contexts] Let R be a binary relation over processes, i.e., a subset of E × E. Let C and D be two contexts and {Y 1 , . . . , Y n } be a set of variables which include all the free variables of C and D. We say
In the case of weak bisimulation, applying the above definition we have that two contexts are weakly bisimilar if all the processes obtained by instantiating their variables are pairwise bisimilar. For instance, using our notation, the contexts 
Secure Contexts
In this section we introduce our notion of secure contexts for a class of processes. This notion is parametric with respect to an operation · l used to characterize the low level behavior, E l , of a process E, and an observation equivalence ∼ used to equate two processes. We denote by ∼ l the relation ∼ on the low level views of processes, i.e., E ∼ l F stands for E l ∼ F l .
Definition 3.1 [Secure Contexts for a Class of Processes]
Let ∼ and · l be an observation equivalence relation and an operation on processes, respectively. Let C be a class of contexts, P be a class of processes, and X be a variable. The class C is secure for the class P with respect to the variable X if for all C[X] ∈ C and for all E ∈ P,
In this definition the variable X is used to determine the "holes" in C which are intended to be filled in by E. Recall that X might not occur free in C. In this case C is trivially secure (by reflexivity of ∼). Moreover, in C there can be other free variables different from X. In this case we have to apply Definition 2.5 and instantiate the other free variables in all the possible ways. Example 3.2 Let ∼ and · l be an observation equivalence relation and an operation on processes, respectively. Let P = {E} and C = {l.X + l.Y + h.Y }, with l ∈ L and h ∈ H. To prove that C is secure for P with respect to the variable X we have to prove that for all F ∈ E it holds l.E + l.F + h.F ∼ l l.E l + l.F + h.F . Similarly, to prove that C is secure for P with respect to the variable Y we have to prove that for all F ∈ E it holds l.
The class C is trivially secure for P with respect to the variable Z, since for all F, G ∈ E it holds that l.
In the rest of this paper when we say that C is secure for P we are implicitly referring to the variable X. The intended meaning of our security definition is that a low level observer cannot distinguish the interactions between a process E ∈ P and a context C ∈ C from the interactions between the low level view E l of E and C. If, accordingly with our intuition, E l represents the low level behavior of E then our definition is clearly in the spirit of the noninterference schema proposed in [9] .
Let us analyze the definition in the case in which only one process and one context are involved. The definition can be read from two points of view: security for the process and security for the context. On the one hand, if a context C is secure for a process E, then E can safely interact with C (security for the process), since C is not able to reveal to the low level users any high level information contained in E. In fact, it is revealed only the information that would be revealed by the interaction with E l . On the other hand, if a context C is secure for a process E, then C can safely interact with E (security for the context). In fact, E is able to reveal the same information which could be revealed by E l that cannot interact with the high level actions of C. In the introduction we gave a first example fitting with the first situation. Here we add two more examples to explain the two points of view.
Example 3.3 [Security for the Processes] Suppose that
Wholesaler ltd is a wholesale company which does not sell its products directly to the final users but only to the shopkeepers. Thus the price of its products can be seen as a confidential data that only the Wholesaler's customers (shopkeepers) are allowed to know. On the other hand the company advertises its products both to shopkeepers (high level) and to potential (low level) users. Consider a Java applet E downloadable from the site of Wholesaler ltd which should allow the shopkeepers to get confidential data like prices and the rest of the world to get a product list with generic information about the products. The applet opens a window with two buttons: the first button allows to read the product list, while the second one allows to read the price list, provided a password is inserted. Let PWD SHOPKEEPER be the high level action representing the fact that E is waiting for a password from a shopkeeper before showing the price list. We assume that this is the only protection for the confidential data in E. The applet E can be represented by the following SPA process, PWD SHOPKEEPER.PRICES + PRODUCTS Wholesaler does not want the applet to be executed on a machine (context) which reveals some high level information (e.g., the price list) to non authorized users. Let us consider two possible contexts. Let C 1 be the machine of the high level user in which the password has been stored (in a cookie). Then C 1 can be represented by a term of the form X|PWD SHOPKEEPER.0.
In this case high level information can be revealed: when a low level user interacts with C 1 [E], he (she) can read the price list. Hence, C 1 cannot be considered secure for E. Another more involved context is, for instance, a machine C 2 shared between high and low level users such that only high level users (shopkeepers) can read the price list, while low level ones can read the product list:
In this case the flexibility of the context is obtained by splitting C 2 into two non-deterministic components: the first one manages the interaction with high level users and has in memory the shopkeeper's password; the second one interacts with low level users and does not provide any password. Note that if a high level user interacts with C 2 [E] by inserting the password PWD HIGH, the PRICES component becomes accessible to low level observers. This can be seen as the possibility for the high level user to downgrade the level of the information stored in the price-list. Intuitively, the process E described here does not satisfy information flow security properties such as noninterference [17] . However, whenever downgrading is a high level user decision, it is reasonable to assume that the context C 2 is secure for E. 2
Example 3.4 [Security for the Contexts] Mr
Earner has on his own machine C some files containing the information about his investments. He would like to check whether they are profitable and, if they are not, to have some suggestions about how to change them. He installed on his machine a program which is able to check on the stock market through an Internet connection, reads his investments files and performs some computations to determine whether the investments are profitable or not. If the investments are going bad, the program checks again on the stock market, for better opportunities. The second check on the stock market is recommended since it allows to use the last quotations for computing suggestions (it is preferable not to use the cached stock market's quotations for this operation which always performs a second check. Notice, that this behavior recalls the case of military radio transmissions. In order to avoid that someone knows when some information has been transmitted, every n instants a message is sent. Only one of the messages contains the real information. Finally, if the market is "stable" and the elaboration of the information in Mr Earner's file is "fast", the following program E 3 can be used It performs the low level input only once before analyzing the situation of the investments and gives its suggestions using the cached data. Also in this case, Mr Earner's machine is secure with respect to this investment program E 3 .
2
When the class C has only one element C we say that C is secure for P. Similarly, in the case in which P has only one element E we say that the class C is secure for the process E. If a context is secure for a class P of processes, then it is secure also for all the subclasses of P. Analogously, if a class of contexts C is secure for a process E, then all the subclasses of C are secure for E. In the general case we obtain the following result. Proposition 3.5 Let C 1 ⊆ C 2 be two classes of contexts, P 1 ⊆ P 2 be two classes of processes, and X be a variable. If C 2 is secure for P 2 with respect to X, then C 1 is secure for P 1 with respect to X. Definition 3.1 introduces a general security notion. To analyze it more concretely it is necessary to instantiate the observation equivalence ∼ and the operation · l defining the low level view of processes. A reasonable requirement to get useful instances is that of using a decidable equivalence and a computable operation.
In the next two sections we consider two instances of our framework. We study the properties of these instances and their connections with some security notions coming from the literature.
First Instance: Weak Bisimulation and Restriction
We analyze the properties of our security definition by instantiating the observation equivalence ∼ and the operation · l as follows: ∼ is ≈ B (weak bisimulation) and · l is · \ H (restriction on high level actions). Using such an instance, a class of contexts C is secure for a class of processes P with respect to a variable X if for all C[X] ∈ C and for all E ∈ P,
In the rest of this section we refer to this instance of our security property. Example 4.1 Consider again Example 3.3 where confidential data are protected only by the password PWD SHOPKEEPER. Assume that PRODUCTS and PRICES show the list of products and of prices to any (low or high) user asking for them. In SPA this behavior is obtained by creating two output actions for both the product and the price list, one for the low level users and the other for the high level ones. Using this first instance we find an interesting connection between our security definition and the security property known as BNDC and proposed by Focardi and Gorrieri in [4] . The security property BNDC is based on the idea of checking the system against all high level potential interactions, representing every possible high level malicious program. In particular, a process E is BNDC if for every high level process Π a low level user cannot distinguish E from (E|Π), i.e., if Π cannot interfere with the low level execution of E.
The following lemma states that the set of contexts of the form X|Π with Π ∈ E H characterizes the class of BNDC processes. In Subsection 4.1 we identify two classes of contexts which are secure for all the processes. Then, in Subsection 4.2 we concentrate on classes of processes characterized by some security notions (basically we will consider subclasses of BNDC) and analyze whether there exist larger classes of secure contexts for them.
Lemma 4.4 Let
E ∈ E. E ∈ BNDC iff C[E] \ H ≈ B C[E \ H] \ H for all contexts C[X] ≡ X|Π
≈ B Instance: Secure Contexts for a generic class P
Next theorem provides a compositionality result for secure contexts with respect to any class of processes. Theorem 4.6 Let P be a class of processes. Let C be the class of contexts containing all F ∈ E; all variables; all contexts of the form li∈L l i .C i + hj ∈H h j .D j , with the C i 's secure for P with respect to X; all contexts C \ v and C[f ] with C secure for P with respect to X. Then C is secure for P with respect to X.
PROOF. See Appendix. 2
Notice that it does not hold that if C and D are secure for P, then C|D is secure for P. This is a consequence of the fact that we do not know anything about the class P.
Example 4.7
Observe that Theorem 4.6 does not provide a decidability result. For instance, if we know that C is secure for P, then we can deduce that C \ v is secure for P, but, in general, we cannot use Theorem 4.6 to prove that C ∈ C and thus it is secure for P.
Hereafter we characterize a decidable class of contexts which are secure for all the processes (i.e., for a generic class P). Obviously we want the class to be as large as possible. In order to obtain the decidability of the class we require a compositionality structure, i.e., contexts are build only using sub-contexts which belong to the class. In order to ensure security we do not use the parallel composition when the context is not a closed term (see Example 4.7).
Definition 4.8 [The Class
C s ] Let C s be the class of contexts which contains all the SPA processes, all the variables, and is closed with respect to the following constructors:
The class C s is decidable, in fact it is easy to define a proof system whose proofs correspond exactly to the constructions of the contexts in C s . 
All the contexts in C s are secure for all the processes, as it is stated by the next theorem. The following lemmas are used in its proof. Theorem 4.12 Let P be a class of processes and X be a variable. If C ∈ C s , then C is secure for P with respect to X.
Lemma 4.10 The relation ≈ B is a congruence in the class
PROOF. The proof follows by induction on the structure of the context C.
• C ∈ E. We have already proved in Theorem 4.6, that C is secure for P.
• C ≡ Y . Again, this has been proved in Theorem 4.6.
• C ≡ i∈I a i .C i . By induction on the C i 's and by Lemma 4.10 we have the thesis.
• C ≡ C 1 \ v. By induction on C 1 and applying Lemma 4.10 we obtain the thesis.
•
. Again, by induction on C 1 and Lemma 4.10 we get the thesis.
• C ≡ recY.C 1 . By induction on C 1 and Lemma 4.11 we have the thesis.
2
Example 4.13 Let C be a machine shared between one low level user and one high level user. When one of the two users is logged, the machine cannot be used by the other one. The logged user can execute his program or a new program which has been downloaded from the web. 
Since C belongs to C s , C is secure for the program coming from the web with respect to X. 2
As shown in Example 4.7, without assumptions on the class P the contexts built using the parallel operator cannot be considered secure. However, as seen in the previous examples most contexts involve the parallel operator, since it is at the core of the exchange of information between processes and contexts. For this reason in the next subsection we concentrate on classes of processes for which we prove that some contexts involving the parallel operator are secure.
≈ B Instance: Secure Contexts for sub-classes of BNDC
As stated in Lemma 4.4 some particular contexts built using the parallel operator are secure for the class BNDC. Unfortunately, the decidability of BNDC is still an open problem, and for this reason many sufficient conditions for BNDC have been introduced and studied in the literature (see [5, 7, 1] ). In particular, in [1] three of these sufficient conditions have been considered and it has been shown that they can be parametrically characterized with respect to a suitable bisimulation relation. In virtue of Proposition 3.5, all the contexts which are secure for the largest of these three classes, that is the one named P BNDC, are secure also for the other two classes. P BNDC is nothing but the persistent version of BNDC. The persistence of P BNDC has been proved to be fundamental to deal with dynamic contexts (see [7] ).
Definition 4.14 [P BNDC] Let E ∈ E. E ∈ P BNDC if E ∈ BNDC for all E reachable from E.
In order to obtain that the parallel composition C|D of secure contexts is still a secure context we need to be able to exchange the parallel operator with the restriction one, i.e., knowing
that C[E]\H ≈ B C[E \H]\H and D[E]\H ≈ B D[E \ H] \ H we want to obtain that (C[E]|D[E]) \ H ≈ B (C[E \H]|D[E \H])\H. Such property holds for P BNDC
processes as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.15 Let E, F, G, K
The previous lemma suggests that if we restrict to contexts mapping P BNDC processes into P BNDC processes we obtain that the parallel composition of secure contexts is secure. In this way we obtain the crucial result on compositionality which was missed in the previous section.
The following definition will be used also in the next section. Definition 4.17 [P-secure contexts] Let P be a class of processes. A context C[X] is said to be P-secure with respect to X if it is a P-context with respect to X and it is secure for P with respect to X.
Definition 4.16 [P-contexts] Let

Theorem 4.18
Let C and D be two contexts which are P BNDC -secure with respect to X. The context C|D is P BNDC -secure with respect to X.
PROOF. The fact that C|D is a P BNDC -context follows from the fact that if two processes are P BNDC , then their parallel composition is P BNDC .
We prove that C|D is secure for P BNDC .
If
then by hypothesis we have C[E]\H ≈ B C[E\H]\H and D[E]\H ≈ B D[E\H]\H.
Moreover, since E \ H is always P BNDC we have that C[E], C[E \ H], D[E], D[E \ H] are P BNDC . Hence, by applying Lemma 4.15 to the four processes we get the thesis. 2
Notice that we can apply the theorem more than once, thus obtaining contexts which involve more parallel operators mixed with other operators.
From Proposition 3.5 we have that the contexts which can be proved to be secure using Theorem 4.18 are secure also for the two subclasses of P BNDC named SBNDC (see [5] ) and CP BNDC (see [1] ), respectively.
Example 4.19
Consider the programs E 2 and E 3 of Example 3.4. They are P BNDC , hence by applying Theorem 4.18 we immediately get that the two contexts of Example 3.4 are secure for these processes.
2 Example 4.20 Let END ∈ L be an action and E be a P BNDC process in which neither END nor END occur. Let P END be a class of P BNDC processes whose termination is announced by the execution of an END action. Consider the context C defined as
When in C we replace the variable X with a process F taken from P END we obtain that F is executed and then E is executed, i.e., we obtain a context which behaves like a sequential operator. From Theorem 4.18 and Proposition 3.5, we have that X|END.E is secure for P END . Hence, from Theorem 4.6, we obtain that C is secure for P END . 2 Theorem 4.18 does not provide a decidability result. In fact, to check that a context is a P BNDC -context, in general, it is necessary to check that an infinite number of processes are in P BNDC . The following definition characterizes a decidable class of contexts which are P BNDCcontexts.
Definition 4.21 [The Class
C p ] Let C p be the class of contexts which contains all the P BNDC processes, the variable X, Y \ H and Y/H for every variable Y , and is closed with respect to the following constructors:
Example 4.22
The contexts X and W \ H belong to C p . Hence, by using the constructor l.
is P BNDCsecure with respect to X.
PROOF.
First we prove that all the contexts in C p are P BNDC -contexts. This is immediate by induction on the structure of the context. In particular, the case of the non deterministic choice can be proved using the unwinding characterization of P BNDC presented in [2] , while the case of the parallel operator is a consequence of the fact that the parallel composition of P BNDC processes is P BNDC (see [7] ). Now we prove that all the contexts in C p are secure for P BNDC . This is immediate by induction on the structure of the contexts. The basic steps are trivial. All inductive steps follow by Theorem 4.6 except the parallel case, which follows from Lemma 4.15. 2
Second Instance: Trace Equivalence and Restriction
Sometimes weak bisimulation is too demanding since in some cases processes which are not weakly bisimilar can be considered equivalent. Wholesaler ltd could imagine that people usually set cookies. Hence, it could decide to change the applet in the following way: if the password is inserted, then the price list is given, but as an encrypted file. The high level user has to use another program to decrypt the file and this program does not allow to store the decryption key. In this case the price list is given in output only through a high level action and the process E becomes 
If we consider the context
However, the low level user cannot read the price list using this context. He can only infer whether a high level user has used the applet to read the price list. Since everybody knows that there exists a price list (and thus its existence is not a secret), in this case the use of bisimulation seems too restrictive. Trace equivalence could be the right choice.
In this section we consider the following instance of our security definition: ∼ is ≈ T (trace equivalence) and · l is ·\H (restriction on high level actions). In this case a class of contexts C is secure for a class of processes P with respect to X if for all C[X] ∈ C and for all E ∈ P,
In the rest of this section we refer to this instance of our security property.
Example 5.2
Consider the context C 1 and the process E of Example 5.1. Using the above instance of our security notion, C 1 is secure for E with respect to X. 2
Let us consider the security property known as NDC (see [5] ) which is defined similarly to BNDC, but using trace equivalence instead of weak bisimulation.
The NDC security property is decidable as it immediately follows from the following characterization, whose proof can be found in [5] .
As in the case of BNDC, it is possible to prove that all the contexts of the form X|Π with Π ∈ E H are secure for NDC processes.
In the next subsection we study contexts which are secure, using this second instance, for all the processes. Then in Subsection 5.2 we concentrate on the contexts secure for the class of NDC processes.
≈ T Instance: Secure Contexts for a generic class P
Since trace equivalence is less demanding than weak bisimulation we immediately obtain that the contexts which were secure in the previous section are secure also in this section.
Theorem 5.6 Let C be a class of contexts and P be a class of processes.
PROOF.
Immediate consequence of the fact that if
This means that the class of contexts of Theorem 4.6 and the class C s are secure for a generic class P of processes also with the second instance of our definition. Next theorem shows that we can enlarge the class of secure contexts for any P.
Theorem 5.7 Let P be a class of processes and X be a variable. A context of the form i∈I C i + hj ∈H h j .D j is secure for P with respect to X if C i is secure for P with respect to X for all i ∈ I.
PROOF. See Appendix. 2
Notice that, also in this case it does not hold that if C and D are secure for P, then C|D is secure for P. The contexts and the process presented in Example 4.7 witness this fact.
≈ T Instance: Secure Contexts for N DC processes
Here we rediscover the analogous of the results proved in Subsection 4.2 for P BNDC processes, in the case of NDC processes. In particular, the following lemma is the correspondent of Lemma 4.15.
This allows us to obtain the following result which states that contexts obtained using the parallel operator are secure for NDC processes when the two contexts which are put in parallel are secure and map NDC processes into NDC processes.
Definition 5.9 A context C[X]
is said to be NDC -secure with respect to X if it is a NDC -context with respect to X and it is secure for NDC with respect to X. Theorem 5.10 Let C and D be two contexts which are NDC -secure with respect to X. The context C|D is NDCsecure with respect to X.
PROOF. The fact that C|D is a NDC -context follows from the fact that if two processes are NDC , then their parallel composition is NDC .
We prove that C|D is secure for NDC . If E ∈ NDC , then by hypothesis we have
are NDC . Hence, by applying Lemma 5.8 to these four processes we get the thesis. 2 Theorem 5.10 does not provide a decidability result. In the following definition we characterize a decidable class of NDC -contexts, which is the analogous of the class C p of Definition 4.21.
Definition 5.11 [The Class
C n ] Let C n be the class of contexts which contains all the NDC processes, the variable X, Y \ H and Y/H for every variable Y , and is closed with respect to the following constructors:
is NDC -secure with respect to X.
PROOF.
First we prove that all the contexts in C n are NDC -contexts. This is immediate by induction on the structure of the context. In particular, we use the fact that trace equivalence is a congruence with respect to non deterministic choice, the fact that if E, F ∈ NDC then E|F, E \ H ∈ NDC (see [4] ). Now we prove that all the contexts in C n are secure for NDC . This is immediate by induction on the structure of the context. The basic steps are trivial. As weak bisimulation implies trace equivalence, all the inductive steps follow by by Theorem 4.6 except cases of parallel and nondeterministic choice. 
. T r(C[E] \ H) = T r(C[E \ H] \ H) and T r(D[E]\H) = T r(D[E \H]\H) for all E ∈ NDC , then T r((C[E]+D[E])\H) = T r((C[E]\H)+(D[E]\H)) = T r(C[E] \ H) ∪ T r(D[E] \ H) = T r(C[E
\ H] \ H) ∪ T r(D[E \ H] \ H) = T r(C[E \ H] + D[E \ H]) for all E ∈ NDC , so we conclude that C[X] + D[X] is secure for for NDC . 2
Related Works
Since the seminal work by Goguen and Meseguer [9] , noninterference plays a central role in the formalization of the notion of confidentiality. Nevertheless, many authors notice that it is too demanding when dealing with practical applications. In [18] , Ryan and Schneider notice that no real policy ever calls for total absence of information flow over any channel, and that in any case this would not be achievable. Thus, they point out the need of investigating generalizations of the notion of noninterference to allow for partial or conditional flows and introduce a general definition of noninterference. They also discuss how such a generalization could be appropriate to deal with realistic practical situations, e.g., with policies that allow for automatic downgrading of certain statistical information from a database. Our definition follows the spirit of [18] and generalizes the formalization presented in that paper by allowing the use of more structured contexts and not considering only tracebased equivalences.
In [12] , Martinelli observes that security properties can be naturally described as properties of open systems, i.e., systems which may have unspecified components. These may be used to represent a hostile intruder whose behavior cannot be predicted or a malicious system component. The verification mechanism proposed in [12] consists of checking that, for any instance of the unknown component, the resulting system satisfies a property expressed in a formula of a suitable temporal logic. In order to make decidable the verification problem, Martinelli does not consider constructs for modelling recursion.
Secure contexts are also studied by Sabelfeld and Mantel in [19] where they propose a timing-sensitive security definition for programs in a simple multi-threaded language. Sabelfeld and Mantel give a syntactic characterization of a class of contexts in their language which preserve security, i.e., they are secure whenever one substitutes holes with secure programs. This, in a sense, corresponds to our general definition of P-secure contexts. In particular, their definition of secure contexts is based on a "hook-up" (compositionality) property [13] of their notion of security. That is contexts just reflect the compositionality property of their security notion. Actually the compositionality of security properties is a fundamental issue in the incremental definition of secure systems (see [15, 23, 21] ). In this work we point out a strong relation between the compositionality properties of a class P of processes and the compositionality properties of P-secure contexts (see Theorem 4.18) . Moreover, we can use our definition of secure contexts to identify new classes of secure processes.
Conclusions
We presented a generalization of the notion of noninterference which is more flexible than the one introduced by Goguen and Meseguer and its subsequent versions. The flexibility is a consequence of the fact that our notion is parametric with respect to a class of contexts and thus not limited to contexts of the form X|Π, with Π ∈ E H .
On the one hand our notion can be used to restrict the set of possible attackers: e.g., when it is not reasonable to assume that an attacker has the ability to perform any high level action. This seems reasonable in practical applications: for instance, when we assume that no all high level passwords can be guessed.
On the other hand our notion allows us to enlarge the set of possible attackers, since SPA operators can be freely combined in the context construction.
Moreover, the possibility of using low level actions in building contexts is useful when we reverse the point of view, i.e., when we are interested in the security of the contexts with respect to a class of processes.
We studied two instances of our general definition with weak bisimulation and trace equivalence. We characterized decidable classes of secure contexts for P BNDC and NDC processes.
An interesting future issue could be the reformulation of our security property in richer languages (e.g., π-calculus).
A. Proofs Proof of Lemma 4.4. (⇒) If
Proof of Theorem 4.6. 
The converse follows by the symmetry of S. We prove the claim by induction on the depth d of the inference used to obtain G[recY.
a −→ P with an inference of depth 0, then the rule "Prefix" has been applied, and
Induction step. We proceed by cases on the structure of the context G: 
a → P by applying the "Sum" in the last step. So, there exists
, and (P, Q) ∈ S.
→ P by applying the rule "Restriction" in the last step. So,
Hence, we conclude 
{(G[(recY.(C \H))]\H, G[recY.C]\H) | G[X], C ∈ C s }.
We prove that S is a strong bisimulation. From this the result follows by considering G[X] ≡ X.
Note that, since C has at most the single free variable Y , the variables that occur bound in G do not occur free in C.
To prove that S is a strong bisimulation we prove: 
